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ARTICLES
Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers,
Moments of Silence, and the
Establishment Clause
ERIC J. SEGALLt
In numerous communities throughout the United States, the Ameri-
can people are fighting over legislative prayer, and the circuit courts of
appeals are struggling over how to handle the problem. For example, in
the Fourth Circuit, the Town Council of Great Falls, South Carolina
used to regularly begin its meetings with Christian prayers, which led to
a lawsuit and a decision invalidating the practice.' The very next year,
however, the same Fourth Circuit allowed the Chesterfield Board of
Commissioners to allow rotating clergy to present prayers at their meet-
ings, even though a Wiccan was denied the same opportunity because of
her unconventional religious beliefs. 2 In the Seventh Circuit, after an
invited member of the clergy sang the song "Just a Little Talk with
Jesus" in the Indiana legislature, lawsuits were filed, appeals were taken,
and eventually the whole controversy ended in a controversial appellate
decision denying standing to the plaintiffs.' The Fifth Circuit also had to
review a school-board prayer practice that was overtly Christian but, at
the end of long and expensive litigation, also decided the plaintiffs had
no standing.4 In a Tenth Circuit case, a citizen wanted to offer a "prayer"
that disparaged the practice of legislative prayer and was denied that
opportunity.' And, here in the Eleventh Circuit, Cobb County, Georgia
began its county commission hearings with sectarian prayers, usually
Christian, and was allowed to continue the practice primarily because of
the Eleventh Circuit's unwillingness to try to distinguish between secta-
t Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Christopher Lund
and Lynn Hogue for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and the University of
Miami Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Eleventh Circuit Issue.
1. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278-80 (4th Cir.
2005).
3. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d
584, 585-86 (7th Cir. 2007).
4. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
5. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228-29, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
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rian and nonsectarian prayer.6 Although reasonable people can debate
the constitutional validity of legislative prayers, no one can deny that
this issue has caused religious and political strife throughout the
country.7
Part of the reason there has been so much litigation over the valid-
ity of legislative prayer is the incomplete treatment the Supreme Court
gave this issue in Marsh v. Chambers.8 In Marsh, the Court upheld
Nebraska's long-time use of a legislative chaplain to deliver prayers
before conducting official business.9 Applying no doctrinal test, the
Supreme Court simply said that the Founding Fathers began their meet-
ings with legislative prayers, there have been such prayers ever since,
and therefore the Court would not rule them unconstitutional.'" This
purely historical test was not reflective of Establishment Clause doctrine
at the time, and is still not today. The Court in Marsh failed to articulate
any nonhistorical legal principle supporting its decision and also failed
to lay down specific rules distinguishing constitutional from unconstitu-
tional legislative prayers. 1 Thus, it has been up to the lower federal
courts to devise guidelines to govern the constitutionality of legislative
prayer. The result has been, in a word, chaos.
Twenty-six years after Marsh, it is now clear that the Supreme
Court should revisit this issue. The circuits are struggling over whether
legislative prayers must be sectarian or nonsectarian, and there are many
different procedures used by state legislatures and local commissions to
choose their clergy, some of which seem constitutionally problematic.
Unless the Supreme Court provides clearer guidance, there will continue
to be significant, expensive, and divisive litigation on these questions in
the lower courts throughout the United States.
Part I of this Article reviews the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision
in Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 2 which upheld sectarian legislative prayer.
Part II discusses one of the difficult issues left unanswered by Marsh-
whether legislative prayer has to be nonsectarian to be constitutional.
Part III argues that the Court should overturn Marsh; otherwise numer-
ous core Establishment Clause values will be infringed by state and local
6. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1266, 1271-72 (1lth Cir. 2008). For a
larger summary of the numerous disputes surrounding the issue of legislative prayer across the
Country, see Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements (Miss. Coll. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2009-03, 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 1335910.
7. See Lund, supra note 6, at 4-5.
8. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
9. Id. at 794-95.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.
11. See discussion infra Part I.A.
12. 547 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2008).
[Vol. 63:713
MIRED IN THE MARSH
governments favoring religion over nonreligion and some religion
(almost always Christianity) over other religions. Instead of prayers, leg-
islatures could constitutionally start their sessions with moments of
silence allowing those who wish to pray that opportunity without restric-
tion and without offending those members of the public and governmen-
tal bodies who do not wish to appeal to divine guidance before they
conduct official governmental business.
I. PELPHREY V. COBB COUNTY
A. Background
The Cobb County Commission and the Cobb County Planning
Commission (Commissions) "have a long tradition of opening their
meetings with" prayers offered by clergy invited by the county on a
rotating basis.13 Although the procedures have changed over the years,
now a paid staff member chooses the clergy from a random list of differ-
ent congregations.14 Although the speakers are supposed to represent
different faiths, the plaintiffs"5 compiled data showing that 96.6% of the
speakers providing the invocation at Commission meetings between
1998 and 2005, "to the extent their faith was discernable, were Chris-
tian."'16 During that period of time, Jewish, Unitarian, and Muslim relig-
ious leaders also occasionally offered opening prayers. 7 Over the past
decade, approximately seventy percent of the invocations contained
some sectarian, "Christian references," although the trial court noted that
these references typically consisted "merely of the closing, 'in Jesus'
name we pray' (albeit, on . . . occasion, with some additional
embellishment)."18
Prior to filing suit, some of the plaintiffs complained to the Com-
missions about the invocation practice, and further provided some of the
commissioners with a list of proposed speakers, but the list was not
given to the person responsible for selecting the clergy.19 The American
Civil Liberties Union also wrote to Cobb County asking that it remove
sectarian references from the invocations.2z When Cobb County refused
13. Id. at 1267.
14. Id. at 1267-68.
15. The plaintiffs were Gary "Bats" Pelphrey, Edward Buckner, Roberto Moraes, Wesley
Crowe, Jeffrey Selman, Roberta "Bobbi" Goldberg, and Marie Shockley. Id. at 1268. All were
taxpayers of Cobb County who attended meetings of the Cobb County Commission and the Cobb
County Planning Commission and witnessed the invocations. Id.
16. Id. at 1267.
17. Id.
18. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted), afd, 547 F.3d 1263.
19. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1268.
20. Id.
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to alter its practices, the plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, filed suit.2
B. The Law
The Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as "whether the practice of
two county commissions that allow volunteer leaders of different reli-
gions, on a rotating basis, to offer invocations with a variety of religious
expressions violates the Establishment Clause."22 The panel began by
discussing Marsh v. Chambers, where the Supreme Court declined to
apply the traditional tests for Establishment Clause challenges and
instead upheld the constitutional validity of legislative prayer based on
an examination of historical practice.23
In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska State Legisla-
ture's daily prayer conducted by a paid Presbyterian minister who had
led the prayers for sixteen years.24 The Marsh Court, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, recounted the history of legislative prayer, which
began with the first Congress and has continued ever since.25 The Elev-
enth Circuit also cited Marsh for the proposition that "[c]learly the men
who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment."26
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the Marsh Court was not
troubled that the Nebraska legislature had used the same chaplain for
sixteen years and "offered prayers in the 'Judeo-Christian tradition.' "27
"Absent proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed from an
impermissible motive,"28 the chaplain's "long tenure" did not violate the
Establishment Clause.29 The Eleventh Circuit also cited the Marsh Court
for the following proposition about the nature of the prayer:
The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here,
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited
to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evalua-
tion or to parse the content of a particular prayer. 30
The Eleventh Circuit also found that two subsequent Supreme
21. Id. at 1266, 1268.
22. Id. at 1266.
23. 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983).
24. Id. at 786.
25. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1269 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88).
26. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788).
27. Id.
28. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
29. Id. at 794.
30. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95).
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Court cases were relevant to the constitutional validity of legislative
prayer-County of Allegheny v. ACLU" and Lee v. Weisman.32 Alle-
gheny held that a creche display in a county courthouse was unconstitu-
tional because it had the effect of promoting or endorsing religion
although the presence of a menorah in a different government building
did not violate the Constitution.33 The Court in Allegheny refused to
extend Marsh's purely historical analysis to other Establishment Clause
issues and also said that even Marsh recognized that "legislative prayers
that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific
faith or belief' violate the Establishment Clause.34 The Allegheny Court,
according to the Eleventh Circuit, found that the Marsh prayers were
constitutional at least partly because the chaplain in Marsh had removed
all references to Christ after a Jewish legislator had complained about
that practice.
In Lee, the Court invalidated nonsectarian prayers at high-school-
graduation ceremonies.36 The important part of Lee, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, was the following statement regarding guidelines the
principal gave the Rabbi for the invocation: "It is a cornerstone principle
of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that it is no part of the busi-
ness of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government."37 Taking Marsh, Lee, and Allegheny together, the Elev-
enth Circuit concluded that it would not review the content of Cobb
County's prayers unless there was independent evidence that they had
been used to advance or disparage a specific religion or affiliate the
government with a particular belief.38
The Pelphrey court also discussed a number of cases from other
circuits. It began with three decisions from the Fourth Circuit, which the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted to not prohibit sectarian legislative prayer.39
31. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
32. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
33. 492 U.S. at 578-79. The difference was that the menorah was surrounded by nonreligious
symbols whereas the creche was not.
34. Id. at 603 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95).
35. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270-71.
36. 505 U.S. at 599.
37. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 588) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38. See id. at 1271-72.
39. The court mentioned Turner v. City Council, which upheld a city policy that legislative
prayer had to be nonsectarian, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (O'Connor, J.); Simpson v.
Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, which upheld nonsectarian legislative prayers, 404
F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005); and Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, which invalidated legislative
prayers that were overtly Christian and therefore advanced the Christian Faith, 376 F.3d 292, 294
(4th Cir. 2004).
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These cases will be discussed in detail in Part II. The Eleventh Circuit
also discussed Snyder v. Murray City Corp., which upheld a city coun-
cil's decision to prohibit a particular speaker from disparaging the prac-
tice of legislative prayer.4" The Pelphrey court interpreted the Tenth
Circuit in Snyder to hold that legislative prayer is unconstitutional only
when it advances or disparages a specific religious belief, which the
Tenth Circuit believed the prayer at issue in Snyder would have done."
The Pelphrey court then discussed decisions out of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits that initially invalidated legislative prayers that were obviously
biased towards Christianity but ultimately dismissed the cases for lack
of standing. 42 And, finally, the Pelphrey court dismissed a Ninth Circuit
decision invalidating the use of a prayer that referred to "Jesus" at
school-board meetings mostly on the basis that the decision was unpub-
lished and thus of no precedential value.4a Summarizing its view of the
law of other circuits, the Pelphrey court concluded that there was no
consensus on the question of the constitutionality of sectarian references
in legislative prayers absent a showing that the government was using
the prayers to affiliate itself with or to disparage a specific religious
belief.44
C. Applying the Law to the Facts
The Eleventh Circuit divided its analysis of Cobb County's specific
practices into three factors: "the identity of the invocational speakers,
the selection procedures employed, and the nature of the prayers. 45 As
to the identity of the speakers, the Eleventh Circuit found that Cobb
County did not unconstitutionally advance the Christian faith by "using
predominantly Christian speakers." 6 Although the court conceded that
the majority of speakers were Christian, it said that prayers were also
offered on occasion by clergy from the Jewish, Unitarian, and Moslem
faiths. 47 The court compared this practice to the prayers upheld in
Marsh, most of which were offered by a permanent chaplain of one
faith, and held that "[t]his diversity of speakers ... supports the finding
that the County did not exploit the prayers to advance any one
40. 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
41. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1274.
42. Id. The Eleventh Circuit discussed Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 494 F.3d 494
(5th Cir. 2007) (en banc); and Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana
General Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
43. 547 F.3d at 1274. The Ninth Circuit case was Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District
Board of Education, 52 F. App'x 355 (9th Cir. 2002).
44. 547 F.3d at 1272.
45. Id. at 1277.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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religion."48
The Eleventh Circuit also, with one exception, found no constitu-
tional problem with the procedures used to select the clergy to give the
prayers.49 The court found that the Commissions compiled a list of pro-
spective speakers from a number of different sources that included a
mosque and three synagogues. The person responsible for the selection
testified that she did not exclude any speaker based on his or her beliefs
and, in fact, was often unfamiliar with the beliefs of the chosen speak-
ers."o And, the court found no constitutional issue with the failure on the
part of two commissioners to forward the plaintiffs' list of potential
speakers to the person making the selections because it was "not the
practice of the commissioners to make suggestions about the faiths rep-
resented on the list of potential speakers . . . .Nothing in the record
suggest[ed] any improper motive on the part of the commissioners. 51
Finally, the Pelphrey court held that the Cobb County prayers did
not violate the Establishment Clause because they at times contained
references to specific deities. The court said that such references were
often short, usually at the end of the prayers, and reflected the beliefs of
diverse faiths.52 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit refused to evaluate the spe-
cific content of the prayers because of its finding that the prayers were
not used to exploit or advance one faith or belief.53 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, "The federal judiciary has no business in compos[ing]
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part
of a religious program carried on by the government. 54
II. SECTARIAN V. NONSECTARIAN
The central basis of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pelphrey was
that federal courts should not parse legislative prayers absent an
improper motive to favor or disfavor a particular faith. Apparently, occa-
sional references to specific religious figures such as Jesus or Abraham
did not meet this standard. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that, as long as the selection process included clergy of different faiths,
sectarian legislative prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1278.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court did find that, for a limited time during 2003 and 2004, the Planning
Commission unconstitutionally excluded certain faiths from being eligible to offer the prayers and
awarded nominal damages to the plaintiffs for that violation. See id. at 1281-82.
52. Id. at 1277-78.
53. See id. at 1278.
54. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Despite what the Pelphrey court said, the Eleventh Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit are now divided over whether the Establishment Clause
requires that legislative prayers be nonsectarian.55 For present purposes,
I will assume that the difference between the two is judicially ascertaina-
ble.56 In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, a Fourth Circuit case, the town
council repeatedly referred to "Jesus Christ" in its prayers, and town
leaders made it clear that they wanted their prayers to be devoted to
Christian worship. 57 The Fourth Circuit invalidated that practice under
Marsh and, in a later decision, Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors, explained in more detail its rationale:
[The] repeated invocation of the tenets of a single faith undermined
our commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in public
life .... Advancing one specific creed at the outset of each public
meeting runs counter to the credo of American pluralism and discour-
ages the diverse views on which our democracy depends.58
Although the facts of Wynne reflected an obvious bias towards Christi-
anity, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Simpson strongly implied that the
legislative prayer practice in that case was upheld primarily because the
town council required that each "invocation must be non-sectarian with
elements of the American civil religion and must not be used to prosely-
tize or advance any one faith or belief."59
The Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey suggested that Simpson upheld
sectarian prayers because the invocations in that case occasionally refer-
enced terms such as "'Lord God, our creator,' 'giver and sustainer of
life,' . . . 'the God of Abraham, of Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad,'
'Heavenly Father,'" and other similar terms.6" Although such references
were apparently used occasionally in Simpson, the Fourth Circuit never-
theless stated that the town had "aspired to non-sectarianism and
requested that invocations refrain from using Christ's name or, for that
matter, any denominational appeal."6 In addition, throughout its opin-
ion the Fourth Circuit strongly suggested that Marsh only permitted
nondenominational prayers. For example, the court said that "Marsh
concluded that non-sectarian legislative prayer generally does not vio-
55. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion that legislative prayers have
to be nonsectarian. See Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App'x 355,
356-57 (9th Cir. 2002).
56. For a discussion of whether this distinction is actually tenable, see discussion infra Part
III.B.
57. 376 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).
58. 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005).
59. Id. at 278.
60. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11 th Cir. 2008).
61. 404 F.3d at 284.
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late the Establishment Clause. 62 The Fourth Circuit also recognized that
the Court in Marsh emphasized that the chaplain there had "removed all
references to Christ."63 Finally, in one of its closing paragraphs clearly
implying that legislative prayer has to be nonsectarian, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated the following:
Marsh requires that a divine appeal be wide-ranging, tying its legiti-
macy to common religious ground. Invocations across our country
have been capable of transcending denominational boundaries and
appealing broadly to the aspirations of all citizens. As Marsh and
other cases recognize, appropriately ecumenical invocations can be
"solemnizing occasions" that highlight "beliefs widely held."
• ..When we gather as Americans, we do not abandon all
expressions of religious faith. Instead, our expressions evoke com-
mon and inclusive themes and forswear, as Chesterfield has done, the
forbidding character of sectarian invocations.64
Whether the best reading of Marsh is that it requires legislative
prayers to be nonsectarian is difficult to determine. As noted earlier, in
Marsh the Supreme Court upheld Nebraska's use of a paid legislative
chaplain (a Presbyterian minister) who had been leading the prayers for
sixteen years.65 The Court rejected the idea that using one minister of a
particular faith for a long period of time violated the Establishment
Clause. The Court said the following:
We cannot, any more than Members of the Congresses of this cen-
tury, perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one
denomination advances the beliefs of a particular church. To the con-
trary, the evidence indicates that Palmer [the chaplain] was reap-
pointed because his performance and personal qualities were
acceptable to the body appointing him. Palmer was not the only cler-
gyman heard by the legislature; guest chaplains have officiated at the
request of various legislators and as substitutes during Palmer's
absences. Absent proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed
from an impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does
not in itself conflict with the Establishment Clause.6 6
As to the content of the prayers, in a footnote the Court said that
62. Id. at 282 (emphasis added) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-95 (1983)).
63. Id. at 286 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)).
64. Id. at 287 (citations omitted). In Turner v. City Council, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
decision by a local legislative body to require its prayers to be nonsectarian and explicitly said that
it did not have to address whether such a policy was required by the Establishment Clause. 534
F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion as a visiting
Justice and wisely decided no more than was necessary to resolve the case. The best reading of
Simpson, however, is that the Fourth Circuit has already decided that the Establishment Clause
requires legislative prayers to be nonsectarian.
65. 463 U.S. at 786.
66. Id. at 793-94 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
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Palmer characterized his prayers as "'nonsectarian,' 'Judeo Christian,'
and with 'elements of the American civil religion.' Although some of his
earlier prayers were often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all refer-
ences to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator. 67 The
Court also stated, in reference to the substance of the prayers, that "[t]he
content of the prayer [was] not of concern to judges where . . . there
[was] no indication that the prayer opportunity ha[d] been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.
That being so, it [was] not for [the Court] to embark on a sensitive eval-
uation or to parse the content of a particular prayer. '68 Based on these
three statements by the Court in Marsh, it appears that using one minis-
ter for a long period of time to deliver legislative prayers is not unconsti-
tutional unless his appointment stems from an improper motive; federal
courts should not "parse" the prayers unless they "proselytize" or
"advance" one faith or "disparage" other faiths; and it was at least some-
what relevant to the Court that the chaplain in Marsh had agreed to
remove all reference to Jesus after a complaint by a Jewish legislator.
How relevant that agreement was to the validity of the prayer in Marsh
is unclear.69
The central question raised by Marsh is whether isolated references
in legislative prayers to Gods of particular faiths render the prayers
impermissible or whether more significant evidence of religious favorit-
ism is required. The Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey held that it was more
important to refrain from policing the content of legislative prayer than
to make sure the prayers were nonsectarian. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
decided that it would violate the teachings of Marsh and Lee were it to
examine the Cobb County prayers for sectarian references. As long as
there is no evidence, apart from isolated references to specific deities,
that the government is advancing a particular faith or disparaging a spe-
cific faith, the Eleventh Circuit said it would allow sectarian prayers. 70
Even assuming that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretations of Marsh
and Allegheny are correct, it is arguable that the panel misapplied the
67. Id. at 793 n.14 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 794-95.
69. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey, the Supreme Court discussed Marsh in
dicta in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In Allegheny, the Supreme Court said
the following about the prayers upheld in Marsh:
[I]n Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the "unique history" of
legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect of
affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief. The legislative
prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this principle because the particular
chaplain had "removed all references to Christ."
Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
70. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1271-72 (1 lth Cir. 2008).
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nonproselytizing standard to the facts of Pelphrey. Between 1998 and
2005, over ninety-six percent of the clergy who gave the prayers were
Christian, and approximately seventy percent of the prayers contained
Christian references.71 To non-Christians who work in the Commissions,
or to those members of the public who attended commission hearings, it
is hard to believe they would not feel that Cobb County preferred Chris-
tianity to other faiths.
In any event, as I will discuss in the next Part, the distinction
between sectarian and nonsectarian prayer is impossible to maintain, and
all legislative prayers that refer to God or a Supreme Being advance
religion over nonreligion. Moreover, the Court's rationale in Marsh is
unpersuasive and leads to a variety of Establishment Clause problems.
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit should have read Marsh narrowly and
limited it to its specific facts, and, more importantly, the Supreme Court
should overturn Marsh and hold that all legislative prayers, like all
teacher- or clergy-led school prayers, violate the Establishment Clause.
III. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Problems with Marsh
The Supreme Court's decision in Marsh lasted less than ten pages
and can be summarized as follows: "The founders did it. Everyone since
them has done it. No one is abusing it. Therefore it is constitutional."72
Even Judge Michael McConnell, a nationally known religion-clause
expert, and someone normally in favor of a narrow reading of the Estab-
lishment Clause, found significant problems with Marsh's purely histor-
ical analysis. He said the following:
The interesting thing about the opinion is that it is based
squarely and exclusively on the historical fact that the framers of the
first amendment did not believe legislative chaplains to violate the
establishment clause....
... What is the significance of this? The Supreme Court, and
those who contend that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by
the framers' opinion about its application to specific cases, treat this
history as dispositive. If James Madison and the boys thought legisla-
tive chaplains were okay, who are we to disagree?
I dissent. I believe that Marsh v. Chambers represents original
intent subverting the principle of the rule of law. Unless we can artic-
ulate some principle that explains why legislative chaplains might not
violate the establishment clause, and demonstrate that that principle
71. Id. at 1267.
72. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church,
81 CAL. L. REv. 293, 338 (1993).
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continues to be applicable today, we cannot uphold a practice that so
clearly violates fundamental principles we recognize under the
clause.73
If state and federal practices that have long been unbroken were
automatically constitutional solely because of their historical pedigree,
many pernicious laws that have been held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court should have instead been upheld. A short but representa-
tive list of such practices would include prayers in public schools," bans
on interracial marriage,"m prohibitions on women embarking on profes-
sional careers such as law,76 and, of course, state-required segregation of
public schools.7 7 The fact is that the Court has almost never upheld a
contested practice solely based on its historical acceptability because
times and values change.78 Therefore, legislative prayer should have
been upheld only if it could have been justified under some Establish-
ment Clause principle that courts could apply with integrity to other
cases. The problem, as discussed below, is that no such principle exists.
There is currently a great deal of confusion among scholars, the
lower courts, and the Justices of the Supreme Court over appropriate
Establishment Clause principles. The highly discredited but often used
Lemon test asks whether the government's action has a secular legisla-
tive purpose; whether the government's action has the primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion; and whether the government's
action results in excessive governmental entanglement with religion.79
The problem is that no one really knows whether the Lemon test is still
good law. One scholar recently summed up the current status of the test
as follows:
Just as previously attempted Grand Unified Theories had to ignore
phenomena they could not explain, the Supreme Court has similarly
73. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362
(1988).
74. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
75. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. But see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
77. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. Criticizing Marsh, one commentator said the following:
One of the most significant changes in the United States since its origins is the
incredible diversity of its religious population; it is now the most religiously
pluralistic nation in the world. Ironically, the years at issue in Marsh, from 1965 to
1983, witnessed extensive immigration of new citizens of non-Christian and non-
European backgrounds. Basing the rules about religion on the practice of the
Founders excludes a wide swath of religions and philosophies from constitutional
protection.
Leslie C. Griffin, No Law Respecting the Practice of Religion, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 475,
479 (2008) (footnote omitted).
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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found cases in which Lemon was less than useful. In such cases, the
Court occasionally simply refuses to acknowledge it. Of course, there
are Justices who openly loathe Lemon and consistently call for its
explicit rejection. Perhaps more puzzling to the observer are those
Justices who remain content to use Lemon as the appropriate test in
some cases but utterly ignore it in others. Perhaps this inconsistent
application best explains the appearance in the last quarter-century of
other analytical models to replace, augment, or explain Lemon.80
Another oft-used approach is to ask whether the challenged govern-
mental activity has the effect of endorsing a particular religion such that
nonadherents would feel like political outsiders.8 ' At times, the endorse-
ment test has been incorporated into the Lemon test, creating even more
confusion.82 It is fair to say that, at the moment, a clear majority of the
Supreme Court has not embraced any particular test for Establishment
Clause challenges.
Regardless of which test is used, however, the decision in Marsh
should not stand. Allowing legislatures to start their sessions with
prayers violates all three prongs of the Lemon test. The practice obvi-
ously has the purpose of advancing religion; otherwise, why have the
prayer? The prayers also advance religion by making references to God
and other religious terminology part of the government's official busi-
ness. And, as the opening of this Article demonstrated, legislators and
citizens will inevitably fight over the content of the prayers and who is
allowed to recite them. As Justice Brennan said in his dissenting opinion
in Marsh, "I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked
to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer,
they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be
unconstitutional. 83
Legislative prayer, especially as it has been implemented since
Marsh, also violates Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. A few exam-
ples make this point rather vividly. In Simpson v. Chesterfield County
Board of Supervisors, the Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors
began its nightly meetings with a "non-sectarian invocation," and the
Pledge of Allegiance.84 The county used rotating clergy chosen by a
clerk from addresses taken from a phone book. The clerk invited a cross
80. John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment Clause, 57
U. KAN. L. REV. 371, 375-76 (2009).
81. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
83. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800-01 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. 404 F.3d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 2005).
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section of religious leaders who were accepted on a "first-come, first-
serve basis."85 The 2003 list included 235 congregations, including an
Islamic Center, a Spanish-speaking Protestant church, Jewish syna-
gogues, and numerous other denominations. In August 2002, Cynthia
Simpson asked to be added to the list.86 Ms. Simpson is a member of the
Reclaiming Tradition of Wicca who claims that she believes in "gods
and goddesses such as Kore, Diana, Hecate, and Pan," and that she is a
"spiritual leader" of this group.87 Her request was forwarded to the
county attorney, who denied it on the grounds that "Chesterfield's non-
sectarian invocations are traditionally made to a divinity that is consis-
tent with the Judeo-Christian tradition," and that Ms. Simpson did not
fall within that tradition.88 Ms. Simpson then filed suit arguing that
Chesterfield's policy violated the United States Constitution. 89
In analyzing Ms. Simpson's claims, the Fourth Circuit recognized
that Marsh allowed legislative prayers but only when "there is no indica-
tion that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief." 90 This test is
similar to the Court's endorsement test, which asks whether the chal-
lenged practice endorses or favors a particular religion such that
nonadherents are made to feel like political outsiders and less valuable
members of the community. 9' Incredibly, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
decision to exclude Ms. Simpson primarily on the basis that Chester-
field's policy was broader than the policy upheld in Marsh that used the
same minister for sixteen years and because, "if Marsh means anything,
it is that the Establishment Clause does not scrutinize legislative invoca-
tions with the same rigor that it appraises other religious activities." '9
The Fourth Circuit reached this decision despite the fact that one board
member stated in the press that Simpson's religion "is a mockery. It is
not any religion I would subscribe to," 93 and a second board member
said, "I hope she's a good witch like Glenda," and that "[t]here is always
Halloween."94
The Supreme Court said in Larson v. Valente that "[t]he clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomina-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 280.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 283 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983)).
91. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
92. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287.
93. Id. at 285 n.4.
94. Id. at 286 n.4.
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tion cannot be officially preferred over another."95 The Fourth Circuit
strongly implied that, had this case not been about legislative prayer,
Larson might well have required a different result.96 But why the bare
fact that the case involved legislative prayer would allow overt religious
discrimination is mystifying. There can be no question that Ms. Simpson
was treated as an outsider and disfavored member of the community on
the basis of her religious beliefs, and, under a proper application of
either the endorsement test or the Lemon test, she should have been
allowed to give an invocation. For that matter, even under the standards
set forth in Marsh, she should have won the case because Chesterfield's
policy clearly disparaged her particular faith. Yet, a unanimous panel of
the Fourth Circuit denied her claim.
Other circuit courts around the United States have allowed similar
denominational discrimination. For example, on April 5, 2005, the Indi-
ana House Legislature began its proceedings with the following prayer
delivered by a Christian minister:
Now let us have a little talk with Jesus
Let us tell Him about our troubles
He will hear our faintest cry
He will answer by and by
Now when you feel a little prayer wheel turning
And you know a little fire is burning
You will find a little talk with Jesus makes it right.97
Following the prayer, the cleric led a "rousing sing-along" of the
song "Just a Little Talk with Jesus." 98 Some members stood and sang
while others walked out in protest.99 After protracted litigation, the
overtly Christian nature of Indiana's legislative prayers became clear.
During the 2005 Session, out of fifty-three invocations, forty-one were
delivered by Christian clergy, nine by representatives of the Indiana
House, one by a Rabbi, and one by an Imam. Of the forty-five prayers
that were transcribed, twenty-nine were demonstrably Christian. 1°"
There can be no debate that, at least during 2005, the Indiana House of
Representatives endorsed, favored, and clearly preferred Christian
prayers to those of other religions.
95. 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
96. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287-88.
97. Anne Abrell, Note, Just a Little Talk with Jesus: Reaching the Limits of the Legislative
Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145, 145 (2007); see also Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp.
2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (adjudicating suit arising from prayer), rev'd sub nom. Hinrichs v.
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
For a discussion of the Bosma case, see Lund, supra note 6, at 6, 18.
98. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 395 (2006).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Although the plaintiffs initially won the case in both the district
court and the court of appeals, eventually the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the
Supreme Court's decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion, Inc. 10 1 A similar case in the Fifth Circuit, Doe v. Tangipahoa Par-
ish School Board, which again involved overtly Christian prayers, was
also eventually dismissed on standing grounds.1 °2 These complex and
highly controversial standing decisions are beyond the scope of this
paper other than to suggest that, were the Court to reverse Marsh and
hold that all legislative prayer is unconstitutional under either the Lemon
test, the endorsement test, or both, it is likely that the courts of appeals
would not be able to dodge these difficult issues by relying on the
Court's much criticized standing doctrine. 0 3
As long as Marsh remains good law, Christian-dominated legisla-
tures will continue to favor Christian prayer while occasionally includ-
ing other faiths as a method to avoid losing in federal court. That is
essentially what happened in Pelphrey, although at least the Eleventh
Circuit reached the merits of the case. Some courts and commentators
have suggested that limiting legislative prayer to nonsectarian prayer
would be consistent with Marsh and could even solve the constitutional
problems under traditional doctrinal tests such as the Lemon test and the
endorsement test."~ The argument is that allowing legislatures to begin
their sessions with appeals to a generic God or to religious but nonde-
nominational values would simply recognize the role religion has tradi-
tionally played in this country without endorsing or advancing any one
faith. The next Part of this Article demonstrates that such a solution is
both constitutionally unsound and virtually impossible to implement in
practice.
B. Sectarian v. Nonsectarian
Any reference to God in a legislative prayer inevitably advances
some religions over others and religion over nonreligion. 10 5 Professor
Delahunty has persuasively argued that every prayer reflects specific
views about religion and "necessarily incorporates a particular theologi-
101. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). For a critique of this case, see Eric J. Segall, The Taxing Law of
Taxpayer Standing, 43 TULSA L. REV. 673 (2008).
102. 494 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc). For a discussion of the Christian nature of
the prayers, see id. at 502-04 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
103. For a discussion of that criticism, see Segall, supra note 101.
104. See, e.g., Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (O'Connor, J.); Lund,
supra note 6, at 7-8.
105. See Robert J. Delahunty, "Varied Carols": Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40
CRIGrroN L. REv. 517, 522 (2007) ("[Tlhe purported distinction between 'sectarian' and 'non-
sectarian' prayer is illusory.").
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cal viewpoint or belief."1°6 Although Professor Delahunty offers this
argument to demonstrate that the sectarian-nonsectarian distinction
should be abandoned as a constitutional requirement for legislative
prayer in favor of a requirement of speaker diversity,' °7 I will demon-
strate that the incoherence of the sectarian-nonsectarian distinction
should lead to the conclusion that Marsh should be overturned and
moments of silence should be substituted for legislative prayer.
Because Professor Delahunty has summarized the arguments as to
why all prayers are sectarian so persuasively and there is little that can
be added, the following is a summary of his fine arguments. There are
over fifty different religious sects in the United States, each with its own
particular ideas of God and faith."0 8 Among these religions, there are
"profound and intractable differences" over the "nature and characteris-
tics" of the Supreme Being. 109 When prayers are offered within the three
leading monotheistic faiths-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-people
of different faiths, or, of course, atheists, are marginalized. Moreover,
any prayer based on the idea of one God inevitably rejects
pantheistic or immanentist conceptions of divinity, such as those
found in some forms of Buddhism or Hinduism. Prayers addressed to
a personal God who hears human petitions and who intervenes in
human affairs will "exclude" the followers of faith traditions that take
ultimate reality to be impersonal, or that believe petitionary prayer to
be useless.1 10
Professor Delahunty also argues that even among the three major
religions in the United States there are intractable differences that make
generic appeals to all three difficult if not impossible. For example,
orthodox "Jewish and Moslem conceptions of God's oneness" are incon-
sistent with "Christian trinitarianism."' " Moreover, Christian ideas of a
God who is a Father who brings redemption through his Son Jesus are
inconsistent with basic tenets of the Jewish and Moslem faiths." 2 And,
of course, this country is made up of far more faiths than the "big three,"
many of whom are offended by traditional prayers that may to some
degree appeal to the major religious traditions, not to mention people
who are not religious at all.
There are numerous other problems with the sectarian-nonsectarian
distinction. First, the very effort to provide prayers that will offend no
106. Id.
107. See id. at 565-68.
108. Id. at 523.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 524.
112. Id.
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one may in the end offend the truly religious. Some spiritual leaders,
when given the choice between offering a nondenominational, nonsec-
tarian prayer or no prayer at all, will certainly choose the latter. This
choice therefore discriminates against those clergy who want to offer
sectarian prayers and those legislators who want to hear them."
13
Moreover, exactly what is and what isn't nonsectarian is a difficult
question that entangles judges in religious questions in a way that threat-
ens Establishment Clause values." 4 Do we really want judges parsing
specific prayers to make sure that they are nonsectarian? This was
exactly the point made by the court in Pelphrey, and the judges' reluc-
tance to review and possibly censor the prayers offered by clergy at the
legislative sessions is understandable but also inevitably leads to the
result that most prayer will end up being Christian in nature-a result
also at odds with the Establishment Clause.
There are those scholars and judges who believe that it is possible
to distinguish between prayers that incorporate civic religion or "cere-
monial deism," and prayers that are religious in nature. The idea is that
generic references to a superior being without more specificity can sol-
emnize governmental occasions by recognizing our religious past with-
out offending nonbelievers. 15 The most significant problem with this
theory, of course, is that it tells atheists that their beliefs don't count and
aren't worthy of being expressed at governmental occasions. The gov-
ernment simply shouldn't be in the business of endorsing the belief that
there is a God, even a generic one. Moreover, by requiring that the gov-
ernment only recognize a generic God (even assuming that can be done),
judges again have to parse prayers and make difficult and arguably
unconstitutional decisions. Finally, the whole idea of civic religion or
ceremonial deism is inconsistent with other religious traditions, and
favoring one over the other "would therefore be an impermissible relig-
ious preference." ' 6
C. The Failure of the Diversity-of-Speakers Approach
Several courts and commentators, aware of the intractable problems
with the sectarian-nonsectarian distinction, have decided that a better
way to accommodate Establishment Clause values is to rely on an
approach that relies on a diversity of speakers to reflect our political
113. Id. at 526-27.
114. See id. at 528.
115. See id. at 528-30.
116. Id. at 532; see also Lund, supra note 6, at 35-36 (noting that excluding sectarian
references in legislative prayers is difficult to justify on moral grounds because it results in
governmental discrimination against speakers based on their religious beliefs).
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community, rather than on judicial review of the prayers themselves. 7
This approach has the benefit of relieving judges of the difficult obliga-
tion of distinguishing between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers, and it
also provides invited clergy the autonomy they need to worship as they
wish. There are, however, three major problems with this approach.
First, as demonstrated below, this practice inevitably leads to legis-
latures giving Christian speakers the opportunity to give Christian
prayers far more often than other denominations. Second, this approach
sends a message to atheists that they are not an important part of the
political community. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the only con-
stitutionally permissible way to implement this diversity of speakers
approach is to have judges decide how much diversity is tolerable,
which will end up being just as divisive, maybe even more so, as judges
parsing legislative prayers for sectarian references. Each of these
problems is discussed below.
The Court in Marsh made it clear that legislatures cannot select the
clergy to give their prayers based on an impermissible motive.' 18 In
Allegheny, the Supreme Court said that "not even the 'unique history' of
legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have
the effect of affiliating the government" with one specific religion." 9
Lower courts have understood these standards to mean that the prayer
givers cannot be chosen based on their religious beliefs, and that it is
unconstitutional to discriminate against potential speakers based on their
spiritual values. ' 20 In other words, the prayer opportunity cannot be used
by legislatures to exploit, advance, or disparage a specific faith.' 2 ' As
the Fourth Circuit said in Simpson:
[R]epeated invocation of the tenets of a single faith undermined our
commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in public life. For
ours is a diverse nation not only in matters of secular viewpoint but
also in matters of religious adherence. Advancing one specific creed
at the outset of each public meeting runs counter to the credo of
American pluralism and discourages the diverse views on which our
democracy depends.' 22
Federal judges are rarely called upon to resolve a claim by a Chris-
tian that a state or local legislature is discriminating against Christianity
117. See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (11 th Cir. 2008); Delahunty,
supra note 105, at 566-68.
118. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
119. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791).
120. See, e.g., Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281.
121. Id. at 1271.
122. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005).
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through its process of selecting guest prayer givers. The reason for this
is obvious: We live in a country where the vast majority of people who
are religious are Christian, and state and local legislatures reflect that
fact. On the other hand, there are many examples of legislatures using
the prayer opportunity to give Christianity a preferred position. The
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all heard cases
where the facts gave rise to a strong inference that the legislatures in
question favored Christianity over other religions. 2 3 We don't need
social-science reports to expect that, if legislative prayers are allowed,
they will most often be given by Christian speakers if for no other rea-
son than state and local legislatures across this country are dominated by
people of the Christian faith.
Applying the "impermissible motive" standard of Marsh and the
rule articulated in Allegheny that legislative prayer cannot be used to
affiliate the government with a particular belief thus becomes a difficult
and divisive task. Two recent cases demonstrate this point. The undis-
puted evidence in Pelphrey showed that between 1998 and 2005, to the
extent that their faith was discernible, 96.6% of the clergy who delivered
the prayers in Cobb County were Christian. 24 Moreover, the evidence
showed that over the past ten years, approximately seventy percent of
the prayers before the commissions contained Christian references.
125
Despite this evidence, the Eleventh Circuit approved the selection pro-
cess because it found no evidence that Cobb County acted with an
improper motive.1 26 One has to wonder what proof, other than an overt
discriminatory motive uttered by a legislator, would lead the Eleventh
Circuit to conclude that Cobb County was affiliating itself with the
Christian religion. If all a legislature has to do to satisfy the Marsh and
Allegheny tests is occasionally have a non-Christian offer a prayer, then
the rule that the government cannot identify itself with a particular faith
is a sham.
The evidence in Pelphrey did indicate that, with the exception of a
few years where intentional discrimination was obviously practiced by
the person selecting the speaker,'2 7 Cobb County did not intentionally
123. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1267; Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of
the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd.,
494 F.3d 494, 502-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (Barksdale, J., dissenting); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls,
376 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2004); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F.
App'x 355, 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
124. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1267.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1278.
127. In 2003 and 2004, the person selecting the clergy used a phone book to choose speakers,
and the book had lines drawn through Islamic, Jewish, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Churches of
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set out to strongly favor Christian clergy or to disparage other faiths.1 28
But to the many non-Christians in Cobb County, the undeniable fact that
the vast majority of prayers in front of their governmental bodies reflect
a faith different than their own is offensive and makes them feel as if
their religious beliefs are not preferred by the government, regardless of
how it came to be that most of the prayers were Christian and contained
Christian references. In light of the religious make up of our country,
facially neutral selection processes like the one employed by Cobb
County will invariably result in this kind of Christian preference. Were it
not for the Marsh exception to the traditional Establishment Clause
rules, this kind of governmental affiliation with one faith would violate
the First Amendment. 129
Another example of a court failing to give the "impermissible
motive" requirement of Marsh any teeth is Simpson. As discussed ear-
lier, the Fourth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a person belonging to the
Reclaiming Tradition of Wicca from those eligible to give a legislative
prayer primarily on the basis that the county's policy allowed a diverse
enough array of religious leaders to lead the prayers even though it
excluded those who didn't come from "monotheistic congregations."' 30
Professor Lund has quite accurately explained why the decision in Simp-
son is so dangerous:
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning.., does not square with the [Marsh]
Court's discussion of [the] impermissible-motive requirement ....
Marsh ...took pains to explain why Palmer's selection did not
reflect any denominational discrimination-Palmer was chosen not
because he was Episcopalian, but because he was the best candidate
for the job. Simpson, by contrast, was rejected precisely because of
her theological beliefs. She was the only one rejected, and the letter
rejecting her specified that it was her religious denomination that was
the basis for her exclusion. Simpson suggests that local governments
have unbridled discretion to pick and choose prayergivers on all man-
ner of religious criteria .... [I]t is hard to imagine a clearer case of
denominational discrimination than what happened to Cynthia
Simpson. 3 '
It might be argued that the problem is not with the legislative-
prayer doctrine as set forth in Marsh, but that the Fourth and Eleventh
Latter Day Saints congregations. Id. at 1282. The Eleventh Circuit found this to be a constitutional
violation and awarded nominal damages to the plaintiffs. Id.
128. See id. at 1267-68.
129. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir.
2005) ("[I]f Marsh means anything, it is that the Establishment Clause does not scrutinize
legislative invocations with the same rigor that it appraises other religious activities.").
130. Id. at 284.
131. Lund, supra note 6, at 41 (footnotes omitted).
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Circuits simply applied that doctrine incorrectly and that Pelphrey and
Simpson should have been decided differently. The problem is that, if
we are going to rely on the diversity-of-speaker approach to safeguard
Establishment Clause values like governmental neutrality because the
sectarian-nonsectarian distinction can't do the job, federal judges are
going to have to make extremely difficult decisions about how much
diversity is required and what lines legislatures can draw when deciding
who to invite and who to exclude. The Eleventh Circuit was not troubled
by the fact that, as far as the record reflected, almost ninety-seven per-
cent of the invited clergy were Christian and over seventy percent of the
prayers contained Christian references. 3 2 Even assuming that the court
was incorrect, what would be the right decision if only seventy-five per-
cent of those invited were Christian, or fifty percent? Does it depend on
the demographics of the community or on the process of selection?
There are no good answers to these questions, and, although judges have
to draw difficult lines all the time, we should not inject Judges into these
kinds of religious disputes.
The Fourth Circuit decided that Ms. Simpson could be excluded
from giving the prayers in large part because her religious beliefs were
outside the mainstream of the community. As Professor Lund discussed,
this kind of holding is a grave threat to the most important Establish-
ment Clause value the Court has articulated-the policy of nondenomi-
national discrimination. 33 There are those who might argue that Ms.
Simpson's beliefs in witchcraft were not religious enough or that the
Fourth Circuit was simply incorrect and should have required the county
to allow her to give the prayer. But the same problem will inevitably
arise with minority faiths of all kinds and courts will have to decide
which faiths count and which do not and whether all faiths have to be
accommodated, which might present serious problems in heavily popu-
lated areas. There is simply no way to implement the diversity-of-
speaker approach and stay consistent with Establishment Clause values.
Inevitably, courts will have to become involved in religious strife, and
equally inevitably they will favor majority religions.
Even if judges and legislatures could implement the diversity-of-
speaker approach consistently with the Establishment Clause, the policy
of allowing legislative prayers favors those who believe in religion over
those who do not. The Supreme Court did not address this issue in
Marsh, instead suggesting that the long history of legislative prayer vali-
dated the practice without consideration of core Establishment Clause
132. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1267.
133. See Lund, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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values.' 34 But the fact of the matter, as demonstrated by the many law-
suits that are filed, is that many people who do not believe in God are
offended when the government begins its official business with a prayer.
The argument may be made that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance, the motto "In God we Trust" on our coins, and the many
religious symbols on government property all attest to the religious
nature of this country without unconstitutionally offending those with no
religious faith. Even assuming the constitutional validity of these relig-
ious references, there are significant differences between those govern-
mental practices and legislative prayer that make legislative prayer more
problematic.
First, as to the motto and the Pledge, there is no danger of denomi-
national discrimination with a bare reference to God. Although this
explanation will not make an atheist feel any better, at least these gov-
ernmental endorsements are as vague and general a statement of relig-
ious belief as possible. Second, our political leaders today do not have to
become embroiled in religious strife with the motto and the Pledge, but
they do have numerous difficult and potentially divisive decisions to
make about legislative prayer. They have to decide (1) whether to have
the prayer in the first place; (2) when it will be said; (3) how often; (4)
for how long; (5) who is eligible to say the prayer and who actually will
say the prayer; and (6) the limitations on what the prayer can say. 135
Unless legislators decide not to have the prayer at all, these questions
require governmental actors to make difficult choices that threaten
Establishment Clause values. The same is simply not true about the "In
God We Trust" motto on our coins and the inclusion of the phrase
"Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.
Of course, similar issues do arise in the complex doctrinal arena of
religious symbols on governmental property. Few scholars or judges,
however, would defend the current state of Supreme Court doctrine on
this question. As one circuit judge famously said, the law in this area is
"more commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judi-
ciary."' 13 6 Interestingly, the law regarding the placement of religious
symbols on governmental property is that they are allowed only if they
are surrounded by other symbols that make it clear that the government
is not endorsing one religious view over another.' 37 This rule cannot be
easily transported into the legislative-prayer context unless we require a
134. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
135. See Lund, supra note 6, at 51.
136. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
137. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
great breadth of speakers and viewpoints, which is unlikely to occur,
very expensive, and almost impossible to define.
In sum, although the Supreme Court has held that legislative-prayer
opportunities cannot be used to affiliate the government with a specific
belief, or to disparage others, the reality is that legislative prayer is usu-
ally Christian in nature and minority religions are not provided the same
opportunities to present the prayers. No "diversity of speakers" rule is
likely to solve these problems, and, in any event, such a rule would
require judges to draw religious lines that would be divisive and diffi-
cult. Moreover, any attempt to require the prayers to be nonsectarian
will not only fail in practice, but discriminate against those speakers
whose beliefs would require them to refer to their specific deities. And,
as discussed earlier, there is no legally coherent distinction between sec-
tarian and nonsectarian prayer.
138
Perhaps then, the argument comes down to the specific facts of
Marsh. Maybe legislative prayer should be allowed but only when there
is a permanent prayer giver who refers only to a generic God in his
invocation. Although this result would be more consistent with Estab-
lishment Clause values than the current regime allowed by the courts of
appeals, it would still discriminate against nonbelievers and would also
be difficult to implement. Judges would still have to decide which crite-
ria are legal for choosing the prayer giver and how prominent a role the
prayer can play in governmental business. More importantly, the result
of such a rule would inevitably be thousands of permanent Christian
prayer givers providing the invocations at governmental meetings all
across the country. 139 It would be similar to having "In Christianity We
Trust" on our coins, a practice that the Court would likely rule violates
the Establishment Clause. There is a better way. The same solution that
has worked for school prayer can be implemented for legislative
prayer-a moment of silence.' 4 °
D. Moments of Silence
Prior to the early 1960s, there was a tradition in this country of
138. See Delahunty, supra note 105, at 522-26.
139. See id. at 563 ("It does indeed seem unlikely ... that any state Legislature in the country
would select a Jehovah's Witness or a Christian Scientist-or a Muslim or Buddhist or member of
Reverend Moon's Unification Church-to be its official chaplain.").
140. Some scholars have suggested that moments of silence would be preferable to legislative
prayers, though I have been unable to find anyone to make a detailed argument in support of that
thesis. See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amendment,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 681, 698-99 (1989); Robert A. Holland, Note, A Theory of Establishment Clause
Adjudication: Individualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying
Threats to Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1595, 1691-92 (1992); Yehudah Mirsky, Note,
Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1256 (1986).
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beginning the public-school day with teacher- or principal-led prayer.' 4 '
In two landmark and highly controversial cases, the Supreme Court held
such prayers to be unconstitutional, even if they were nonsectarian, and
despite their history.142 In Engel v. Vitale, the Court said the following:
There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program offi-
cially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents'
prayer. The respondents' argument to the contrary, which is largely
based upon the contention that the Regents' prayer is "non-denomi-
national" and the fact that the program, as modified and approved by
state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits
those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the
room, ignores the essential nature of the program's constitutional
defects. Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is
voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establish-
143ment Clause ....
The Court went on to say:
It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing
or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function
to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for
religious guidance. 44
Eventually, as the doctrine in this area developed, the Court prohib-
ited all speaker-led prayers in public schools, even at graduation cere-
monies and athletic events. 145 What courts have allowed, however, are
moment-of-silence statutes requiring that schools begin the day with a
moment of silent reflection as long as such practices do not promote or
endorse prayer. 46 Although there are certainly differences between
adult legislators and impressionable school children, there are still com-
pelling reasons why the moment of silence solution for public schools
would work as well for legislative bodies. What Justice O'Connor said
about moments of silence in schools applies equally to legislatures:
A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment
of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible
141. See BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: How ENGEL V. VITALE
CHANGED AMERICA 182-83 (2007).
142. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
143. 370 U.S. at 430.
144. Id. at 435.
145. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (athletic events); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (school-graduation ceremonies).
146. See Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11 th Cir. 1997).
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reading, need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a
pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise
his or her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a student who objects
to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to
listen to the prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple reasons, a
moment of silence statute does not stand or fall under the Establish-
ment Clause according to how the Court regards vocal prayer or
Bible reading.' 47
A legislature starting each day with a moment of silent reflection
allows each person to use that time in a way that most benefits his or her
conscience without infringing on the rights of others. Moreover, unlike
the case with school prayer, even if the intent behind the moment is to
encourage prayer, as long as there was no direct coercion, there probably
would not be a constitutional violation.' 48
The primary objection to this moment of silence proposal might be
that the whole point of having a religious prayer is to recognize and
solemnize the legislative proceeding with a communal spiritual moment
that brings legislators together in a common enterprise. But it is exactly
this purpose that should make the prayer unconstitutional under a proper
Establishment Clause analysis. Those members of the legislature, and
the public visiting the proceedings either for personal or business rea-
sons, who are not members of the faith endorsed by the particular
prayer, usually Christian, will feel excluded from the collective religious
moment sponsored by their government.'49 With a moment of silence,
those who wish to pray to a Christian God may do so, those who wish to
pray to a different God may do so, and those who don't want to pray at
all don't have to but still must respect the moment and the needs of
others to pray. The giving up of the communal moment seems a small
price to pay for the constitutional simplicity of substituting a moment of
silence for legislative prayer.
Finally, if the Court were to hold that legislative prayers are uncon-
stitutional but moments of silence led by a legislator or nonreligious
guest speaker are not, all of the difficult questions pertaining to the
validity of legislative prayers would vanish. Federal judges would no
longer have to worry about the content of the prayers, the identity of the
prayer giver, and the selection process used to choose those who lead the
147. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. See id.
149. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[1]t seems incredible to suggest that
the average observer of legislative prayer who either believes in no religion or whose faith rejects
the concept of God would not receive the clear message that his faith is out of step with the
political norm.").
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prayers. There would no longer be divisive litigation all over the coun-
try, and, more importantly, infighting among legislators, and between
legislators and the public, would stop. And maybe, just maybe, the relig-
ious and the nonreligious would bond together in a collective moment of
serious reflection that instead of causing strife and discord would lead to
unity, collective understanding, and respect.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Court upheld legislative prayers in Marsh, lower
courts have been struggling with how to answer the many important
questions left unanswered by the Court. Whether the prayers may con-
tain sectarian references and what kinds of procedures may be used to
select the prayer givers are just two of the difficult problems that have
bedeviled the lower courts. The result has been politically divisive litiga-
tion and intense religious battles across the United States. It is past time
for the Court to realize that it made a mistake in Marsh by utilizing an
antitheoretical historical approach inconsistent with any principled inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause. Legislative prayers unlawfully
endorse and advance religion and should be deemed unconstitutional. In
their place, legislatures could start their days with moments of silence
and peaceful reflection, which will allow everyone to pray as they wish
without causing offense to those who don't wish to pray and have the
potential to unite both the religious and the nonreligious in a moment of
common purpose. This solution to the intractable problems raised by
legislative prayer is far more consistent with our history and traditions
than the spate of overtly Christian messages that have been endorsed by
state and local governments ever since Marsh was incorrectly decided
over twenty-five years ago.
2009]
